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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
John L. Flynn*
Only a General Intent is Required by Statute
Rendering Criminal the Possession of Bur-
glar's Tools with Intent to Commit Burglary-
Defendant was observed as he entered the
vestibule of an apartment building and rang a
particular bell. The elevator indicator showed
his ascent to the floor of that dwelling and short
hesitation there. Other brief stops were made on
the way down, and his apprehension in the
lobby revealed burglar's tools concealed on his
person. A conviction followed under indictment
charging the possession of burglar's tools with
intent to break into a specific apartment. Upon
appeal he contended that the indictment
charged intent with reference to a particular
apartment and that such was not proved. The
Illinois Supreme Court held, People v. Taranto,
119 N.E. 2d 221 (Ill. 1954), that the statute
required only a general intent to use the tools
for criminal purposes and that the allegation
specifying a particular apartment was im-
material.
City Liable for Injuries Sustained by Citizen
While Aiding Police-A private detective who
sustained injuries when he responded to the
request of a police officer to assist in arresting
persons who were attempting to assault the
officer has been awarded a judgment against
the City of New York. Riker v. City of New
York, 126 N.Y.S. 2d 229 (1954). A group of
youths who were loitering around a business
establishment from which they had been
ordered to leave, began to throw objects at the
police officer. The court held the situation did
not constitute a call to aid in suppressing a
riot (in which case the city would not be liable)
and awarded damages under a statute."
Religious Speaker Must Comply with Police
Order Not to Obstruct Traffic-The police
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department had allocated a certain corner to a
religious speaker for his meetings. A large
crowd was attracted by the speech with a
consequent obstruction of traffic. After the
defendant speaker ignored three requests to
move closer to the curb, he was arrested by
the officer assigned to the corner. The court
found the defendant guilty of disorderly con-
duct and imposed a suspended sentence.
People v. Kunz, 128 N.Y.S. 2d 157 (1954).
The opinion conceded that primarily it was the
responsibility of the police department to
regulate the comer after permitting its use.
However the defendant knew what cooperation
he was reasonably expected to give. The right
to preach is not absolute. It is relative and
must be subordinate to the public good.
Compulsory Chemical Tests for Intoxication
-N.Y. Vehicle ahd Traffic Law, §70-a (1952)
provides in effect that an operator of a motor
vehicle is deemed to consent in advance to
submit to chemical and blood tests adminis-
tered at the direction of a police officer having
reasonable grounds to suspect the operator of
driving in an intoxicated condition. A refusal
to submit is grounds for revocation of his
driver's license. In Schutt v. MacDuff, 127
N.Y.S. 2d 116 (1954), the statute was held
unconstitutional because it failed to provide
for a hearing before revocation, and because it
was not limited to a case where there had been
a lawful arrest. However, the Schut case
established that the statute is not violative of
the constitutional privileges against self-in-
crimination or against unreasonable searches
and seizures. In People v. Kovacik, 128 N.Y.S.
2d 429 (1954), some further aspects of the
statute were upheld. Defendant submitted to
a blood test after being told he would lose his
license if he did not. The court held that there
was no duress present, but merely a statement
of the statutory provision. (Although this
case was decided after the Schutt case, the
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statement was made previous to it). The court
also rejected contentions that the statute was
unconstitutional because of a failure to include
a provision giving defendant notice of the
statutory right to have his own physician ad-
minister an additional test, and that the
drunkometer is inaccurate and unreliable so
as to be an arbitrary exercise of authority.
The courts now have passed on practically
every facet of the statute, and since the statute
has recently been amended to provide for a
revocation hearing, the statute in its entirety
should be upheld in a subsequent test.
(An early issue of the Journal will contain a
leading article dealing with the N.Y. statute
in further detail.)
Sheriff Serving Writ, Valid on its Face, is
Not Liable for False Imprisonment-Plaintiff,
a member of the armed forces, was arrested by
two Vermont deputy sheriffs on writs of
attachment and capias (mesne process). After
twenty-two days confinement, the plaintiff
obtained his release by habeas corpus and
brought a false imprisonment action against
the sheriff for the action of his deputees. A
federal statute provides, "No enlisted man
shall, during his term of service, be arrested
on mesne process .... " 3 Stat 225 (1815),
10 USC §610 (1946). The court held that
while the person who sued out the writ or his
attorney might be liable, where the process
proceeds from a court having authority to
issue such process and there is nothing upon
its face to fairly warn the server that it is
defective, the officer is protected from ir-
regularities existing behind the process. Wil-
liams v. Franzoni, 120 F. Supp. 444 (D. VT.
1954).
Power of State Police in Incorporated Areas
-Defendant was found guilty of accepting
bets on horse races and maintaining premises
for such purposes. The commissioner of police
of Cumberland, Maryland, an incorporated
municipality, had requested the assistance of
state police to investigate gambling in Cum-
berland. Two state police officers, who had
been detailed in compliance with this request,
testified against the defendant as to matters
observed by them in defendant's pool hall. A
statute provided that the state police shall not
act within the limits of any incorporated
municipality "except when requested to act...
by the chief police officer of the municipality
in question." Defendant's principal contention
was that the court erred in instructing the
jury that the police commissioner had authority
to request the detailing of state police to the
investigation. On appeal, the conviction was
affirmed. Little v. State, 105 A. 2d 501 (Md.
1954). The court held that even though Cum-
berland also had a chief of police (who made
no request), the phrase "chief police officer"
referred to the ranking police officer who in
this case was the commissioner. Moreover, said
the court, even if the detailing of these officers
were not authorized, as members of the general
public they had a legal right to enter the pool
hall and could testify as to their observations
there.
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